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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Appellant has failed to comply with its obligation to adequately marshal all of the
evidence supporting all of the trial court's decision in this case. This failure is particularly
critical because the full summary of all evidence before the trial court demonstrates the
circumstances and scope of the Appellant's breach and the Appellee's entitlement to its
remedies. For these reasons, the Appellee recites and expands the relevant facts to
demonstrate the correctness of the trial court's award in favor of the Appellee.
In September 1998, American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American Housing"), an
experienced real estate developer, entered into a contract to purchase real property in West
Jordan, Utah (the "Property") from a group of sellers (the "Coon Group"). (R. 231, 235;
R. 408: Tr. 19; Ex. No. 30.) Armando Alvarez ("Alvarez"), a real estate broker licensed in
Utah and California, handled all transactions for Appellant American Housing, which is
ownedby Alvarez's brother. (R. 408: Tr. 9-10.) American Housing's contract with the Coon
Group required closing within 120 days. American Housing applied for a zoning change
with the City of West Jordan (the "City), which was necessary for American Housing to be
able to subdivide and develop the Property and to sell the lots for profit. (R. 408: Tr. 19-20.)
Alvarez expected City approval to be obtained within the 120-day time period under the
contract with the Coon Group. (R. 408: Tr. 46.)
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Prior to August 1999, Alvarez and American Housing had prior dealings with
Jim Fairboum of Fairboum Commercial, Inc. ("Fairboum Commercial"), involving
Jim Fairbourn's representation of sellers in several transactions. (R. 409: Tr. 303-304.)
Starting about January 1999, Alvarez and Jim Fairboum discussed the Property in general
terms, with the discussions anticipating the possibility of Fairboum Commercial listing the
future sale of lots in the Property for American Housing. (R. 408: Tr. 52; R. 409: 305.)
Because of delay in obtaining City approval for a zoning change, the Coon Group, as
seller, and American Housing, as buyer, signed an Addendum to their sales contract
extending the closing date until April 15, 1999, and requiring American Housing to deposit
an additional $10,000.00 with the escrow agent by March 15, 1999. (R. 408: Tr. 48;
Ex. No. 32.) American Housing did not make that deposit and received notice from the Coon
Group terminating the Coon Group contract because of American Housing's default. (Ex.
No. 33.) Furthermore, the City denied the zoning application in April 1999. (Ex. No. 54.)
Frustrated with the difficulties in obtaining zoning approval and the current problems
involving the status of the Coon Contract, Alvarez in June or July 1999, asked Jim Fairboum
if Jim Fairboum could find a buyer for the entire Property. (R. 408: Tr. 53.) Those parties
discussed various ways to sell, including Jim Fairbourn's suggestion that the Property could
be sold as "paper lots," which Alvarez had not sold before (R. 408: Tr. 53, 54; R. 409: 307,
310; R. 406: 518.)

4814-6554-3424 FA371 006

2

Marshall Larson ("Larson"), who became an agent for Fairbourn Commercial
August 1st (R. 232, 234), obtained an interested buyer in Rochelle Properties, LC
("Rochelle"), an affiliate under common control with Liberty Homes, Inc., a large Utah
homebuilder. (R.233.) On August 6,1999, David C.Clark ("Clark"), manager of Rochelle,
signed a letter of intent to purchase the Property for $23,000.00 per lot. (R. 409: Tr. 261;
Ex. No. 1.) Clark was very interested in purchasing the Property, expecting it to be the West
Jordan inventory for Liberty Homes and being convenient to two existing model homes.
(R.408:Tr.261.)
Fairbourn Commercial acted as American Housing's real estate agent in the
transaction, and Larson represented Rochelle. (R. 409: Tr. 315; Ex. No. 2.) After receipt of
the letter of intent, a meeting occurred in American Housing's office, consisting of Alvarez,
Jim Fairbourn, Larson, Clark and Irv Gardner ("Gardner"), of Rochelle. (R. 233.) The
parties discussed Rochelle's proposed purchase of the Property from American Housing,
including what assurances American Housing requested to show Rochelle's ability to
perform. (R. 408: Tr. 56-57, 60; R. 409: 261-264, 288-291, 397-401.) According to Clark,
Gardner, Jim Fairbourn and Larson, Alvarez said that he wanted some evidence of Rochelle' s
ability to perform. (R. 233; R. 409: Tr. 264, 289, 312,402.) These witnesses further stated
that no mention was made of any line of credit, cash on hand or firm bank commitment,
which Alvarez testified he insisted on. (R. 408: Tr. 60; 409: Tr. 264, 291, 314, 404.)

4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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August 13, 1999, Jim Fairbourn delivered to Alvarez a Single Party Listing and Sale
Agreement (the "Single Party Listing Agreement") and an offer from Rochelle, (R. 233),
consisting of a standard form Real Estate Purchase Contract prepared by Larson, together
with an Addendum No. 1 prepared by Gardner on behalf of Rochelle. (R. 409: Tr. 313;
Ex. No. 3). The Single Party Listing Agreement provided for payment to Fairbourn
Commercial of a commission of $1,500.00 per lot if the Property was sold to Rochelle for
$2,277,000.00 for an estimated 99 lots. (R. 233; Ex. No. 2.)
Alvarez signed the Listing Agreement but subsequently rejected this first offer.
(R. 408: Tr. 62.) Three days later, August 16th, Rochelle presented a second offer through
its agent consisting of a form Real Estate Purchase Contract and an Addendum No. 1,
prepared by Larson. (R. 233, 266-267, 408, 409; Tr. 63-64; Ex. No. 4.) Alvarez prepared
a counteroffer to Rochelle's second offer. In preparing the counteroffer, Alvarez specifically
and in detail set out a number of paragraphs detailing the arrangement, including insertion
of definitional and clarifying language. (R. 408: Tr. 67-73; Ex. No. 4.) One of the
paragraphs, entitled "financial capability," stated:
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties,
Buyer shall supply to Seller with evidence of financial capability to
close on the Property within the time frame referenced above. In the
event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole
option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any further
obligation to the other.
(R. 233-234; Ex. No. 5.)
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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The counteroffer also provided, inter alia, for a 21 day due diligence period,
acknowledged that American Housing had given only limited information to Rochelle, and
required a $50,000 earnest money deposit1, which, after a short due diligence period, would
become non-refundable, the refund not being conditioned upon financing. (R. 406, 408,
531; Tr. 63-64; Ex. No. 4.) Additionally, upon lapse of the due diligence period, Rochelle
was obligated to take title to the Property subject to all conditions affecting the Property,
subject to the existence of any environmental problems, and subject to all risks arising from
lack of City zoning approval. (Ex. No. 4.) Moreover, Rochelle was dependant upon
American Housing's good faith in continuing to work with the City in getting final approval,
with no meaningful remedy if American Housing did not comply with that obligation.
(R. 406: Tr. 527.)
Thereafter, a meeting occurred in American Housing's office, involving Alvarez,
Jim Fairbourn, Larson and Clark. Those individuals reviewed in detail the Agreement,
including American Housing's counteroffer. Included in the discussions was the "financial
capability" clause, which required compliance within only fourteen days from the contract
signing. (R. 234.) Alvarez told Clark that he wanted a letter from a bank showing a
willingness to lend to Rochelle. (R. 409: Tr. 270.)

1

Alvarez acknowledged that neither he nor American Housing had ever had as
large as $50,000 earnest money deposit required in any prior transaction. (R. 408: Tr. 67,
68.)
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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By August 30 , only with initialed changes to a paragraph specifying time for closing,
the Agreement, including American Housing's counteroffer, was signed by both the seller
and buyer. (R. 409: Tr. 317; Ex. No. 4.) Rochelle deposited the $50,000.00 earnest money
with the escrow agent and undertook the efforts and began paying money toward its formal
due diligence. (R. 409: Tr. 319; Ex. No. 6; Ex. No. 7.) This executed agreement is referred
to herein as the "Rochelle Contract."
By the date the Rochelle Contract was signed, American Housing had resolved its
immediate time pressures regarding the Property. After the City had earlier rejected the
zoning application, Alvarez and LaMar Coon had held a "closed door" meeting with some
City councilmen. Alvarez received indication of the City's willingness to grant the zoning
if Alvarez could include an additional five or six acres of property for the project. (R. 408:
Tr. 161-162.) In June or July 1999, American Housing succeeded is obtaining rights to
purchase that additional acreage. In addition, on August 23, 1999 (a week prior to the
effective date of the Rochelle Contract), the LaMar Coon Contract was reinstated, extending
its closing date to December 1, 1999. (Ex. No. 31.)
Pursuant to the "financial capability" clause in the Rochelle Contract, Rochelle
arranged for a letter from Cy Simon ("Simon"), construction loan officer of First Security
Bank, to be delivered to American Housing stating the Bank's willingness to make
acquisition and development loans to Rochelle. (R. 235; R. 409: Tr. 234-235; Ex. No. 9.)
Alvarez rejected that letter without explanation. Rochelle then arranged for a second letter
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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from the Bank, dated September 17, 2000, providing more detail as availability of credit
lines, amounts of currents loans in place and painting a positive picture of the Bank's
willingness to lend, with predictable, guarded bank rhetoric. (R. 236; R. 409: Tr. 235-238;
Ex. No. 10.)
Alvarez never inquired of Simon or First Security Bank, never requested financial
statements, and never requested any other information relating to Rochelle's financial status
or ability to perform. September 21,1999, Alvarez, by telephone, advised Jim Fairbourn that
Alvarez was rejecting the letters and terminating the contract. Alvarez then sent a notice of
termination to the title company, arranging for the title company to return the $50,000.00
earnest money payment to Rochelle. (Ex. No. 12.) The trial court found that the "financial
capability" clause in the Rochelle Contract was ambiguous and that Alvarez should have
been aware of the ambiguity after receipt of the first letter from the bank. Further, the trial
court found that Alvarez, had an obligation to clarify the ambiguity, but that Alvarez never
gave any explanation before he unilaterally gave his notice of rejection. (R. 237.) The sole
reason Alvarez subsequently gave for the rejection was the failure to comply with the
"financial capability" clause.

At trial, he acknowledged his understanding that the

commission to Fairbourn Commercial was fully payable if the Rochelle Contract closed.
(R. 408; Tr. 90.)

4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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By the time of American Housing's cancellation of the Rochelle Contract, though,
Alvarez was aware of opportunities for significantly greater profit if American Housing were
now to develop and sell the Property itself as "paper lots." (R. 409; Tr. 219-22.) Alvarez
had become familiar with the status of property development in the area of the Property,
including American Housing's familiarity with Leon Peterson ("Peterson"), who was
developing five acres of property adjacent to the Property and was seeking City application
for approval at the same time as American Housing was seeking approval for its Property.
(R. 408; Tr. 108-109.) Alvarez had also become familiar with other Peterson property
transactions. October 13, 1999, less than a month after Alvarez sent the notice terminating
the Rochelle Contract, American Housing received an offer from Peterson to purchase the
Property. (R. 408; Tr. 127; Ex. No. 13.) October 26th, Alvarez presented a counteroffer,
which, together with a letter of final modification created a final contract of sale to KFP
Corporation (the "Peterson Contract"). (Ex. No. 14.)
Alvarez told Jim Fairbourn, subsequent to and despite the signing of the Peterson
Contract, that American Housing intended to keep and develop the Property itself. (R. 409;
Tr. 325-27.) Significantly, although neither Rochelle nor Fairbourn Commercial had, by that
time, advised or threatened American Housing as to any claim or problem involving the
language of the Rochelle Contract's "financial capability" language (R. 408; Tr. 129-130),
American Housing, in its counteroffer to the Peterson Contract, had, itself, included a

4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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"financial capability" paragraph similar to the Rochelle Contract language, but which added
and expanded the "financial capability" language to read as follows:
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties,
Buyer shall deliver to Seller evidence of financial capability to close on
the Property within the time frame referenced above. In the event
Buyer is unable to provide evidence acceptable to Seller in Seller's sole
discretion. Seller shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement. Escrow
Agent shall return the Deposit to Buyer and neither party shall have any
further obligation to the other, (emphasis added)
Despite the language in the counteroffer in the Peterson Contract, Alvarez never
sought any financial statements, never did any credit investigations, and did not initiate any
inquiries of any nature to verify the financial ability of KFP or Leon Peterson to perform
under the Peterson Contract. (R. 408; Tr. 138.) By accident, and not through any efforts by
Alvarez to seek information, Alvarez received a telephone call from a loan broker for
Peterson.

(R. 408; Tr. 139.) During the call, discussion occurred about the credit

circumstances and willingness to loan under the Peterson Contract. (R. 408; Tr. 139-140.)
There followed a fax from the loan broker to Alvarez indicating no anticipated problems in
obtaining a loan but emphasizing that the loan application had not been submitted nor
approved and that the letter constituted no commitment to the borrower. (R. 408; Tr. 140141; Ex. No. 17.)2

2

This Peterson lender "assurance" states:
Armando,
This is to confirm that KFP Corporation has requested a loan for the project
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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The zoning change approval for the Property was finally approved by West Jordan
City in January 2000.

The closing and settlement of the Peterson Contract occurred

January 19, 2000, with American Housing having previously assigned its interest to Midas
Creek Estates, LLC. (R. 408; Tr. 155-156.) The total purchase price was not paid in cash.
Included with the closing was a note for $31,000.00 payable from KFP Corporation secured
by a trust deed, instead of being entirely a cash closing. (Ex. Nos. 24-27.)
American Housing, by selling to Peterson for a higher purchase price and attempting
1o eliminate the commission to Fairbourn Commercial, netted a bottom-line profit of an
additional $266,000.00. (R. 408; Tr. 153-154.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

American Housing has no basis, under any applicable principle of contract law,

to avoid paying the commission through its breach of contract.

known as West Jordan Meadows or Wood Creek 9 & 10. The loan will be for
approximately $3,575,000 which will provide some funds towards the purchase of
the land, lot improvements, and soft costs. This size loan is within [the lender's]
informal limit to this borrower and within the borrower's financial capacity. The
loan structure contemplated is within our underwriting guidelines and I do not
foresee any problems during the approval process.
The loan is not yet approved and there is no commitment to the borrower. We
anticipate submitting the loan for approval either the week of November 22nd or
the week of November 29th.
Please call me ifyou have any questions.
(Ex. No. 17.)
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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a.

Long-standing and uniform principles of contract law in all jurisdictions

prevent American Housing from taking advantage, and avoiding the consequences,
of its own breach of contract.
b.

Long-settled Utah law provides that, absent language in the listing

agreement to the contrary, a real estate commission is earned in appropriate
circumstances when the contract is signed. This is applicable even in general cases
which, unlike this instant case, has broader language involving "ready, willing and
able" language. No evidence was presented at trial providing any foundation to
consider reversal of this long-standing Utah law.
c.

Since the contracts at issue in this case involve transactions for the sale

of commercial property negotiated among sophisticated and knowledgeable parties,
the authorities relied on by American Housing are inapplicable in this case.
Regardless, even if this Court were to apply the holdings in those cases to the instant
case, those cases still consistently provide that a breaching seller cannot avoid the
payment of commission by preventing the closing of the sale.
2.

Commission disputes arising under existing Utah law generally presuppose that

closing failed to occur; yet in appropriate circumstances judgments are granted for
commission earned absent closing. Therefore, unless well-settled Utah law were to be
reconsidered, in reality there exists no "case of first impression" applicable to the issues in

4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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this case. It follows that analysis of whether a closing is a condition precedent to the
obligation to pay a commission is more relevant in the minority line of cases previously
rejected by this Court. But even then, all of the cases cited by American Housing for its
position hold that a seller cannot avoid payment of a commission when that seller wrongfully
is the cause for the failure to close.
3.

The trial court, as the finder of fact and determiner of the weight and credibility

of the evidence and witnesses, correctly found that the "financial capability" clause requiring
"evidence of financial capability to close" was ambiguous. The trial court correctly
determined that the ambiguity should be interpreted against its drafter and further correctly
determined that American Housing was unjustified in terminating the entire sales contract
and refusing to close.
4.

The Single Party Listing Agreement, negotiated for American Housing by its

representative who was a sophisticated broker licensed in Utah and California, specifically
identified the buyer and the terms of the sale and the commission. This contract was
narrower and different from commonly-used listing agreements which provide for payment
of a commission upon the seller's real estate agent finding an unspecified "ready, willing and
able" buyer. For this reason, Appellant's arguments and its cited authorities involving issues
of "ready, willing and able" buyers in the context of commonly-used listing agreements do
not apply to the interpretation and application of this narrowly customized Single Party
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Listing Agreement. Likewise, public policy principles upon which cases cited by Appellant
are based, are inapplicable to the case at hand because this case does not involve the public
policy issues behind those cases, such as differences in experience, sophistication and
bargaining position between the seller and its agent.
5.

The Rochelle Contract was negotiated among sophisticated and experienced

realtors and developers with the substance of that contract represented by a counteroffer,
including the "financial capability" clause at issue, being drafted in great detail by Alvarez,
American Housing's representative. The agreement, being ambiguous, was appropriately
interpreted against American Housing.
6.

No evidence has been presented or heard at any time in this case which would

relate to whether existing Utah law should be reconsidered or overturned. Indeed, no issues
have previously been raised with respect to real estate listing agreements generally which,
through this unrelated case, would justify a reexamination of public policy.
7.

Inherent in the transactions with Fairbourn Commercial and Rochelle was

American Housing's covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including circumstances in
which a party claims discretionary rights under a contract. American Housing breached the
Rochelle contract and the Listing Agreement with Fairbourn Commercial by canceling the
Rochelle contract without cause.
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ARGUMENT
I
AMERICAN HOUSING CANNOT AVOID ITS OBLIGATION TO PAY
A COMMISSION BY BREACHING THE AGREEMENT AND
ASSERTING THE RESULTS OF THAT INTERFERENCE AS A
DEFENSE
American Housing, in this appeal, cavalierly dismisses, and seeks to avoid, the
consequences of its own breaches of contract which the trial court identified. Both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals found that Fairboum Commercial had earned its commission,
though each court grounded its decision upon a different principle of law for awarding
judgment to Fairboum Commercial. The trial court carefully examined three days of
testimony and extensive evidence, focusing upon all of the circumstances surrounding the
entry into the Rochelle Contract and American Housing's breach thereof. The Court of
Appeals, on the other hand, focused solely upon the Single Party Listing Agreement and
applied Bushnell v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983), and related long-standing Utah law.
Fairboum Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2003 UT App 98,
68 P.3d 1038. Even Alvarez acknowledged that Fairboum Commercial would have been
entitled to payment of its commission upon closing of the contract. (R. 408; Tr. 90.) But
American Housing contends that the listing agreement, providing for the earned commission
to be "due and payable at closing"(Ex. No. 2), absolutely precludes payment thereof. The
Court of Appeals dismissed American Housing's argument. In doing so, the Court of
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Appeals stated that it is an issue of first impression as to whether the phrase "due and payable
at closing" constitutes a condition precedent to payment or whether that phrase merely
establishes the payment time. Determining that the terms of the listing agreement were
dispositive of the issues, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to analyze the Rochelle
Contract ambiguities. Fairbourn, 68 P.3d at 1040-41. The Court then held that the listing
agreement language is not a condition precedent to payment of the commission. Id. at 1042.
American Housing continues to urge this Court that the commission being payable at
closing was an absolute condition precedent to payment and that, since closing never
occurred (albeit through American Housing's own breach), the commission therefore is not
payable. In other words, American Housing's argument stands for the proposition that a
seller can always avoid its contractual obligations by breaching the sale contract and
precluding the occurrence of a condition precedent {i.e., closing) to its commission
obligation.

Fairbourn Commercial respectfully suggests that American Housing's

revolutionary approach to contract law would plow far more ground than the complained-of
Court of Appeals' decision. If this position allowing "escape-by-breach" were adopted,
Fairbourn Commercial suggests that no logical reason exists to limit that revolutionary theory
to listing agreements alone and not to produce undesired results in other types of contract
issues. It further rings hollow to argue that there is something sui generis about a real estate
broker's contract because of compelling social concerns, such as bargaining power or the
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need to create incentives for closing. Factual differences exist between parties in numerous
transactions; and it ignores reality to suppose that analysis of a party's good faith and
performance are not always legitimate areas of inquiry.
To bolster its position, American Housing further argues that the Court of Appeals
either misread or inappropriately applied that court's cited cases and, therefore, the Court of
Appeals holding in this case is automatically wrong and must be reversed.
But American Housing's arguments miss or avoid the most overriding consideration.
As discussed in detail in this brief, regardless of any one or more of alternative principles of
law which a court might consider applicable in this case, as well as under all of the
authorities American Housing cites for its position, American Housing still would not be
excused from paying the commission because of its own breach. Regardless of which path
American Housing takes, American Housing still bumps into its own breach because:
1.

Long-held and consistent general contract law precludes a party to a contract

from excusing the performance of a condition when that party is the cause of failure of
performance;
2.

Settled Utah law under Bushnell and related cases provides that, absent

conditional contract language to the contrary, a real estate commission is payable when the
seller enters into the contract of purchase, regardless of the occurrence of closing; and
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3.

All authorities cited by American Housing stand for the proposition that a

breaching seller cannot escape payment of commission because of a resulting failure to close.
No principle of contract law or line of cases stands for the proposition that a
breaching seller can rely upon a "payable at closing" language to excuse the commission
obligation. This is equally true in American Housing's own cited cases which, as in the socalled New Jersey line of cases, American Housing asks this Court to adopt. All cases still
leave open the issue of the seller's own breach and refuse to provide an escape route to such
a breaching seller.
A.

WELL-ESTABLISHED CONTRACT LAW PRECLUDES AMERICAN HOUSING FROM
AVOIDING PAYMENT OF THE COMMISSION

The law is well settled that a party cannot avoid its contract obligations through its
breach of the contract. This has been the case in Utah, as well as other jurisdictions, and has
continued for years before the Bushnell decision. It remains the law today. American
Housing cannot simply point to the fact that closing did not occur to relieve itself of liability
for failure to pay Fairbourn Commercial its entitled commission, when the sole reason
closing did not occur was because of American Housing's own breach of the Rochelle
Agreement. "But for" American Housing's breach, American Housing would have sold the
property to Rochelle. "[A] party who commits the first breach of contract cannot maintain
an action against the other for a subsequent failure to perform." Lynch v. MacDonald,
367 P.2d 464, 469 (Utah 1962) (Citations Omitted).
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See, e.g., Fisher v. Taylor,

572 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 1977) (holding that defendant, having caused first breach, cannot
complain of a subsequent breach or take advantage to avoid its own liability); Driver v. Salt
Lake & Ogden Gas & Elec. Light Co., 61 P. 733 (Utah 1900) (stating that a person cannot
take advantage of his own wrong and exempt himself from liability under a contract);
17A AM JUR 2d Contracts §§ 717 and 718.
This principle specifically includes provisions which are conditions precedent to
completing the contract. In Cannon v. Stevens Sch. of Bus., Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385
(1977), this Court stated: "Defendant would not be entitled to prevail even if its assertion of
an implied condition precedent were accepted." That Court then addressed with approval the
statement by Professor Williston, that "it is a principle of fundamental justice that if a
promissor is himself the cause of the failure of performance of a condition upon which his
liability depends, he cannot take advantage of that failure." Id. at 1385. See 5 Williston on
Contracts, 3rd Ed. -Jaeger, § 677, pp. 224-233.
This universal principle of general contract law also specifically applies to payment
of real estate commissions. This Court, setting out the law even prior to Bushnell, stated:
This Court recognizes the principle of law that a party to a real
estate listing agreement cannot prevent or interfere with the
performance of the agreement and then assert the nonperformance as
a defense. However, such is not the fact in this case.
The Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1977).
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B.

BUSHNELL ENTITLES FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL TO RECEIVE ITS EARNED
COMMISSION EVEN THOUGH CLOSING DID NOT OCCUR BECAUSE OF AMERICAN
HOUSING'S BREACH

The general rule in Utah is that, without a contract provision that conditions the right
to a commission upon the buyer's performance, an agent earns a commission upon procuring
a buyer who is willing and able, and accepted by the seller. The Court of Appeals in this case
relied principally upon Bushnell in which this Court stated:
. . . Absent a contractual provision, which conditions the right to a
commission on the performance of the buyer, the general rule accepted
in Utah is that a broker has earned his commission upon the procuring
of a buyer who is ready, willing and able, and who is accepted by the
seller. The broker is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of
the contract and is not deprived of his right to a commission by the
failure or refusal of the buyer to perform. See e.g., F.M.A. Financial
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670 (Utah 1965). This is the rule
followed in a majority of jurisdictions. The defendants cite
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967), as
authority for the proposition that notwithstanding the clarity of the
documents in imposing an unconditional liability for broker' s fees there
should be an implied condition in the note setting up a waiver of fees
if the buyer defaults before completion of the transaction. This is a
minority rule contrary to the decision in F.M.A. Financial Corp. v.
Build, Inc., and is factually distinguishable in that the Ellsworth Dobbs
decision involved inequality of bargaining power. In the instant case,
the parties dealt voluntarily and in a commercial setting. . . .
672P.2dat751.
The Bushnell holding arose from the common types of listing agreements which
involve criteria of a "ready, willing and able" buyer. Arguably, in cases construing those
types of agreements, whether an offering buyer meets those criteria can raise factual inquiries
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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as to the nature and quality of the buyer. But, significantly, as the Court of Appeals correctly
noted, those issues do not apply in this case because the Single Party Listing Agreement has
no "ready, willing and able" language. Fairbourn, 2003 UT App at Tf 14. Rather, this Single
Party Listing Agreement specified from its outset a particular buyer, with particular terms of
purchase. It should be noted that the Bushnell analysis focuses upon the breach by a buyer
who is not a party to the seller's listing agreement. Fairbourn Commercial's claim in this
case, though, is even stronger because it focuses upon the breach by American Housing, the
seller itself, which signed the Single Party Listing Agreement.
American Housing, implying that the Court of Appeals' reliance on Bushnell caught
everyone by surprise, states that both parties, their counsel and the trial court all interpreted
the Single Party Listing Agreement to be contingent upon closing. (Brief of Appellant,
p. 28.) Of course, the commission was to have been paid at closing if American Housing had
permitted the closing. But that does not mean that everyone considered the closing to be an
absolute precondition to payment. To the contrary, Fairbourn Commercial has consistently
argued that Bushnell and its line of cases apply in this case. {See pp. 25-25 of Fairbourn
Commercial's Court of Appeals Brief, attached as Exhibit "A.") The trial court chose not
to base its decision on Bushnell, but, instead, focused upon the legitimate analysis of
American Housing's breach of contract under the arrangement with Rochelle. Of course, this
Court may affirm the trial court decision on any proper ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
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Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Fairbourn Commercial suggests that it would be
correct to affirm the trial court decision solely on the Bushnell analysis, solely on the trial
court's analysis, or both.
Utah's longstanding law, including Bushnell, is consistent with the majority of courts
in the country. While American Housing claims reversal of Bushnell is not necessary to
provide the remedy sought by American Housing, it argues vigorously that this Court should
indeed overrule this long precedent to adopt the New Jersey rule articulated in Ellsworth
Dobbs and its related line of minority cases which hold that closing is a condition precedent
to payment of the commission. For reasons more fully analyzed in Section 1(C) below,
Fairboum Commercial suggests that considering the wholesale reversal of Bushnell without
any evidence or other proven, or even proffered, basis for this action would be untimely and
unwise. Regardless, even if Bushnell were abandoned in favor of the Ellsworth Dobbs line
of minority cases, presumably all principles in those cases would also appropriately be
adopted, including the consistent holding in those cases (more fully detailed below) that a
seller cannot escape payment of a commission when the seller's breach is the cause of the
failure to close.
Significantly, Bushnell was decided after the Ellsworth Dobbs line of cases quoted by
American Housing. This Court, therefore, has already specifically considered and rejected
the reasoning in the Ellsworth Dobbs cases. American Housing acknowledges that Ellsworth
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Dobbs represents a minority line of cases. (Petition for Certiorari, p. 10.) But American
Housing then, in its Brief of Appellant before this Court mixes the Ellsworth Dobbs cases
together with other cases, involving a plethora of facts and issues, to conclude that, voila, the
Ellsworth Dobbs position on payment of a commission is, after all, really the majority.
Accordingly, it is argued Utah is really is in the minority on this issue and is somehow out
of step with the rest of the country.
American Housing cites as authority a number of cases in the minority, which
supposedly are uniform in holding that closing is a condition precedent to payment of the
commission. In some cases, that is the settled minority law. However, American Housing
incorrectly depicts the holdings in numerous cases as cited authority for its rationale. Instead,
these cases cited by American Housing accept the general rule that a commission accrues
upon obtaining a "ready, willing and able buyer," but distinguish the particular cases based
upon independent factual situations, e.g., Hodges v. Lewis, 246 P.2d 676, 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1952) (acknowledging a general rule that commission earned upon securing ready,
willing and able buyer; but this present case was not an ordinary one); Clark v. Provident
Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 198 A. 36, 38 (Pa. 1938) (stating this contract was outside the
well-settled rule of a commission accruing upon a ready, willing and able buyer upon agreed
terms); O'Boyle v. DuBose-Killeen Properties, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Tex. App.
1968) (holding that the writing which was relied on by broker was different from normal
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ready, willing and able provisions); Nicoud v. Boley, 248 N.W. 452,453 (Wis. 1933) (stating
that a specific provision removed this case from the general rule that commission is owing
upon ready, willing and able buyer at the requested price). See also, Rogers v. Hendrix,
438 P.2d 653, 656 (Id. 1968); Home Federal Saving & Loan Assn. v. Illustrated Properties
Realty, 465 S.2d 1244,1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Berman v. Hall, 340 A.2d 251,25253 (Md. 1975); Silhouette Realty, Inc. v. Wilson, 24 A.D.2d212,214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
So even following the holdings of those cases, failure to close does not preclude
examination or application of a seller's breach.
C.

T H E COURTS, INCLUDING THE JURISDICTIONS CITED BY AMERICAN HOUSING,
UNIFORMLY HOLD THAT A PRINCIPAL CANNOT ESCAPE PAYING A COMMISSION
W H E N THE FAILURE TO CLOSE IS THAT PRINCIPAL'S FAULT

American Housing cites numerous cases for the position that supposedly betterthinking courts hold that closing is always a condition precedent to payment of the
commission. However, even assuming for argument that all of American Housing's cited
cases stand for that asserted general proposition (without the actual case-by-case variation
based upon the language of the respective listing agreements and the differences in factual
circumstances), all cases in that line uniformly hold that a principal whose own wrongful
actions precluded the closing cannot assert failure of that condition as a defense to not paying
the commission. Ellsworth Dobbs, indeed, specifically notes this important exception from
its general holding , saying "[I]f the failure of completion . . . results from the wrongful act
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or interference of the seller, the broker's claim is valid and must be paid." Ellsworth Dobbs,
Inc., 236 A.2d at 855. All of the other cases cited by American Housing also take that same
position. See Hodges (emphasizing that there was no evidence of seller's fault to close);
Setser v. Commonwealth, Inc., 47 P.2d 142, 147 (Or. 1970) (holding that the rule requiring
closing is not applicable when the sale is aborted by seller's repudiation of the contract);
Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Mass. 1975) (stating broker's claim
is valid if failure of completion is from the seller's wrongful act or interference); McMurray
Co. v. Wiesman, 260 N.W.2d 196, 201 (Neb. 1977) (stating that broker has earned
commission on unjustified failure or refusal of seller to perform); Berman at 252-53
(emphasizing no allegations that the purchaser was at fault indicating commission would
otherwise have been payable); Amies v. Wesnofske, 174 N.E. 436, 438 (N.Y. 1931) (stating
that promissor cannot take advantage of failed condition when he caused the failure);
Goetz v. Anderson, 21A N.W.2d 175, 181 (N.D. 1978) (holding that commission is owing if
seller's refusal to consummate the transaction is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or
wrongful); Silhouette, 24 A.2d at 214 (holding there was insufficient evidence that failure
of closing was seller's fault); O'Boyle, 430 S.W.2d at 280 (stating there were no facts on
record that appellees failed to carry out agreement terms).
Accordingly, the failure of closing is not a self-operating event precluding
examination of, and ignoring the consequences from, the seller's fault. Even under the
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minority line of cases represented by Ellsworth Dobbs, American Housing's own breach
would compel payment of the commission.
D,

T H E COURT OF APPEALS' DISCUSSION OF A "CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION" IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO BUSHNELL BUT, RATHER, RELATES TO THE MINORITY CASES

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Fairbourn
Commercial.

Determining that Bushnell is dispositive, the Court of Appeals held it

unnecessary to consider the trial court's analysis of American Housing's breach of the
Rochelle Contract. Fairbourn, 2003 UT App at Tf 14. Further holding that the execution of
the Rochelle Contract completed the analysis requiring payment of a commission, the Court
of Appeals then focused on that Court's depiction of a "case of first impression" as to
whether the language "due and payable at closing" conditioned payment of the commission
upon closing or whether it was a statement as to when the payment was due. The Court of
Appeals held that such language was a statement of when payment was due, not //payment
was due.
American Housing jumped on the "case of first impression" language for the
proposition that the Court of Appeals incorrectly cited or applied the cases it cited in support
of its holding and that, thereby, the decision should be overturned. But American Housing
does not connect all of the dots. Whether or not a "case of first impression" applies to the
case at hand, American Housing still cannot ultimately avoid the analysis and application of
its own breach.
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Fairbourn Commercial suggests that the Court of Appeals, in raising and discussing
this issue in a "case of first impression" context, may have caused possible confusion as to
the applicable law. For this reason, it makes a difference whether a court follows Bushnell
or Ellsworth Dobbs. As discussed below, it is respectively suggested that, the Court of
Appeals' statement notwithstanding, whether closing is a condition precedent to payment of
the commission is not an issue of first impression under Bushnell. Otherwise Bushnell makes
no sense and provides no practical remedy for its holding. It is a "case of first impression"
only if this Court were to adopt the Ellsworth Dobbs line of cases.
This instant case does not involve a listing agreement granting a commission upon
finding a "ready, willing and able" buyer. Rather, Fairboum Commercial was required under
its "one party" narrow listing agreement, to obtain a contract from the pre-identified buyer
for the pre-identified price. Hence, Bushnell governs this case just as it also applies to
broader factual situations in dictating that a brokerage commission is earned "upon the
procuring of a buyer who is ready, willing and able, and who is accepted by the seller."
672 P.2d at 751. The disputes in those types of cases arise because o/the failure to close;
and, regardless, judgment is granted for the commission. Bushnell specifically addresses the
issue when it is the buyer, rather than the seller, who fails to close, saying that "[t] broker is
not deprived of his right to a commission by the failure or refusal of the buyer to perform."
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672 P.2d at 751. A fortiori, it could not reasonably be argued that the Bushnell holding
would not be applicable in this case of a seller preventing closing.
But, regardless, the sale contract in the Bushnell case did not close. So the awarding
ofjudgment for the commission is inherent in the Bushnell ruling itself. And it is suggested
that this is why no string of Utah cases exist agonizing about whether failure to close thereby
prevents payment of the commission. Otherwise, Bushnell would be nonsensical, awarding
the commission but providing no ultimate remedy through its judgment because closing did
not occur.
Although Bushnell expressly rejected the Ellsworth Dobbs minority line of cases, the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that there is a "case of first impression" concerning timing of
the payment would only make logical application if this Court were to reject Bushnell and
consider the adoption of the Ellsworth Dobbs line of holdings in which those cases condition
payment of a commission to the occurrence of closing. But the Bushnell Court had carefully
considered the Ellsworth Dobbs arguments and was aware of the concerns and policies
behind that line of minority decision. This Court, therefore, far from being asleep at the
switch, specifically noted that the Ellsworth Dobbs case was "factually distinguishable in that
the Ellsworth Dobbs decision involved inequality of bargaining power." 672 P.2d at 751.
But most important-which American Housing continues conveniently to ignore-is
that even the Ellsworth Dobbs cases do not preclude the scrutiny of a seller's conduct and
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breach of contract. As analyzed in detail in Section 1(C) above, all of the cases upon which
American Housing relies and which condition the commission payment to closing, assume
the seller's performance. No case lets a seller off the hook when the seller has wrongfully
prevented the closing.
E.

RECONSIDERATION OF THE BUSHNELL LINE OF CASES, WITHOUT DEVELOPING THE
ISSUES AND EVIDENCE, WOULD BE UNNECESSARY, UNTIMELY AND UNWISE

American Housing asks that Bushnell be overturned. Accordingly, this issue should
be addressed generally to demonstrate the mappropriateness of this request by American
Housing. Of course, upon the showing that there exist issues of great public interest or
societal impact, this Court may grant standing to consider the merit of the claim and make
appropriate decisions. But any reconsideration of law should be based upon compelling and
convincing evidence for this Court to undertake such examination. No evidence or argument
was provided, or even proffered, in the trial court which relates to whether or not Bushnell
should be reconsidered or whether any circumstances or public policy considerations exist
which should compel a reexamination of settled Utah law. It is inappropriate for American
Housing to seek the reversal of well-reasoned and well-settled law as a subterfuge to excuse
American Housing's breach in a single, unique case. Absent a litigating party having a
personal stake in the outcome of such a ruling, any examination based on imagined fears is
not good policy.
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It is further respectfully suggested that simply setting out the holding of separately
factually-distinguishable cases, most of them having previously been examined and rejected
by this Court, is not sufficient to compel a re-visitation of longstanding Utah law. This Court
stated in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983):
Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah
is not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the
United States Constitution requiring "cases" and "controversies," since
no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution. We previously
have held that "this Court may grant standing where matters of great
public interest and societal impact are concerned." However, the
requirement that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of
a legal dispute is rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the
judiciary in Utah.

Inherent in the tripartite allocation of governmental powers is the
historical and pragmatic conviction that particular disputes are most
amenable to resolution in particular forums. The requirement that a
plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is intended
to confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation of powers,
and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are
most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process.
The courts are most competent in the exercise of their function when
they have a "concrete factual context conductive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." A plaintiff with
a direct and personal stake in the outcome of a dispute will aid the court
in its deliberations by fully developing all the material factual and legal
issues in an effort to convince the court that the relief requested will
redress the claimed injury. (Citations omitted)
Except for seeking redress for its own breach, American Housing cites no legitimate
reason, or indeed proffers any specific arguments, urgencies or problems (other than its

4814-6554-3424 FA371 006

29

academic analysis through citing cases from other jurisdictions), requiring such a massive
overhaul and reversal of law. In determining whether an issue in this case is "of great public
interest or societal impact," it is relevant that no recent "enlightened" line of cases exist
which counter the Bushnell result. Goetz, the most recent of this line of minority cases
holding that (absent seller's fault) commission payment is conditioned on closing, is twentyfive years old. American Housing does not point to any existing rush and urgency among
courts to change their longstanding majority position, nor does American Housing identify
anything in the system that is broken and must be fixed. Equally significant is the fact that
no evidence, indeed no proffer of evidence, before the trial court even attempted to examine
circumstances, business practices or existence or lack of existence of circumstances in the
real estate industry that somehow compel a reexamination after all these years of Bushnell.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, it is at least as reasonable to conclude that the
courts, within the context of Bushnell in Utah, as well as the other majority cases nationwide,
deal with these issues in pragmatic and normal methods of contract interpretation. Moreover,
it is also reasonable to conclude that major abuse is not a problem. Given the paucity of
information generated by American Housing in this case, it is just as reasonable to conclude
that: there exist various degrees of the regulation and codes of ethics of realtors which
preclude the feared flood of problems; most problems are precluded by effects of the
marketplace; sellers may not be as unsophisticated as some assume; the real estate profession
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is not unprofessional as curmudgeons assume; and courts do a good job of protecting parties
on a case-by-case basis. American Housing presents nothing new, but merely presents
conjecture and old reasoning from cases largely preceding Bushnell.
Equally important, as much as American Housing would like to redefine the parties'
relationship to encourage this Court to overturn long-settled precedent, this case is
significantly distinguished from the Ellsworth Dobbs line of cases which involve listing
agreements providing the seller to pay a commission when a broker finds a "ready, willing,
and able purchaser" who is unidentified. The public policy concerns articulated by Ellsworth
Dobbs and by the commentators cited by American Housing include the perceived difference
in bargaining position, differences in knowledge, respective abilities to evaluate the buyer,
disincentives for broker to push a contract to closing, expectations of the parties to the listing
agreement and the like. See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc., 236 A.2d at 853-56; Milliken, When
Does the Seller Owe the Broker a Commission? A Discussion of the Law and What it
Teaches About Listing Agreements, 132 MIL. L. REV. 265 (1991); Note, Arguing for the
Minority Rule: An Efficient Approach to Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 82 B.U. L.REV.
195 (2002).
This case differs from the public policy cases cited by American Housing, because it
involves: a narrowly-focused Single Party Listing Agreement negotiated between two
experienced brokers; a purchase contract negotiated between two experienced realtors and
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developers; equality in bargaining power existing (indeed, possibly a larger bargaining
position on the part of American Housing itself, who had rejected an initial agreement and
insisted on its own language for the final agreement); a customized Single-Party Listing
Agreement identifying the specific buyer and the specific terms of seller, not just a general
unidentified potential buyer; and the trial court finding that the failure to close was American
Housing's fault.
It is, therefore, unjustified to attempt to overlay with this Court the supposed
Ellsworth Dobbs policy considerations in a circumstance in which Ellsworth Dobbs is not
even relevant or applicable.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
AMERICAN HOUSING BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT
A.

AMERICAN HOUSING CANNOT OVERCOME THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE
EVIDENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

Because of the trial court's advantaged position, the trial court's fact determinations
deserve a "fair degree of deference" since the trial judge observed the evidence, including
the "witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
be adequately reflected" in the appellate record. Department of Human Servs. ex rel
Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). As such, the trial
court's findings of fact are upheld unless the evidence supporting them is sufficiently lacking
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and the findings are clearly erroneous. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998),
cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1990).
A principal issue for the trial court's finding was the nature and interpretation of a
"financial capability" clause in the contract in dispute. Challenging the trial court's finding
that this clause drafted by American Housing was ambiguous, American Housing seeks this
court's imprimatur on American Housing's own chosen contract interpretation, which the
trial court rejected. In challenging these factual findings, though, American Housing picks
and chooses, and puts its own spin on, the supposed facts supporting its position. Regarding
the disputed contract language alone, it is insufficient for American Housing simply to assert
what American Housing says it expected as "evidence" of Rochelle's ability to perform.
Moreover, it is not sufficient simply to restate what is in the trial court's Memorandum
Decision and omit all other evidence which was submitted to the trial court and which
supports the trial court's decision. See, Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32,
TJ15,48P.3d888.
Following a three-day trial during which the trial court heard testimony, determined
the credibility of witnesses, and reviewed all of the evidence, the court ruled in favor of
Fairbourn Commercial with respect to the issues on appeal. This analysis included the
resolution of testimony involving the parties' conversations and interpretations regarding the
"financial capability" clause and the context in which it was negotiated and applied.

4814-6554-1424 FA371006

33

The trial court, among its other findings, expressly rejected the testimony of Alvarez
as to what he supposedly said at the meetings. (R. 235.) Rather, the trial court gave
credibility to Fairbourn Commercial's witnesses concerning these conversations and the
parties' interpretation of the applicable language. (R. 234-235.) In short, the trial court had
ample and credible evidence to support its findings and rulings.
B.

CREDIBLE EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT
THE FINANCIAL CAPABILITY CLAUSE DID NOT EXCUSE AMERICAN HOUSING'S
PERFORMANCE

The language of the "financial capability" clause at issue, drafted by Alvarez, required
Rochelle to supply "evidence of financial ability to close on the property within the time
frame referenced above [14 days]." American Housing claims that this clause, absent more
specific language, unambiguously required a binding loan commitment, letter of credit, or
availability of cash. American Housing further urges that American Housing had the
unilateral right to terminate the contract if Rochelle did not provide evidence of one of those
unspecified requirements. In support of American Housing's interpretation, Alvarez testified
that he specified these requirements at two separate meetings with other witnesses discussing
the contract requirements. (R. 408: Tr. 56-60, 89, 102.)
The trial court's rejection of such arguments is supported by credible evidence. As
the trial court pointed out: "The language of the clause gives no guidance to either the
quantity or quality of evidence which Rochelle must produce to demonstrate financial
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capability." (R. 236.) The trial court expressly rejected Alvarez's testimony on this point
and accepted the contrary testimony, expressly finding that Alvarez made no such
explanation. (R. 235.) The other witnesses, particularly Clark, whose credibility the Court
specifically noted, testified that Alvarez, in two separate meetings in which that language was
discussed, asked only for "a letter from a lender that states that more than likely you'll be
creditworthy. . . ." (R. 409: Tr. 270.) Indeed, the Court specifically found the following:
. . . I do not find that Mr. Alvarez expressed to anyone at anytime his
intention that only a binding loan commitment or letter of credit would
satisfy his definition of adequate financial capability. The participants
in this transaction shared considerable experience and sophistication in
real estate development and financing. I credit the observation made
by David Clark, the owner of Liberty Homes who negotiated on behalf
of Rochelle, that he would have taken note of a demand that the
evidence be in the form of proof of available cash, a loan commitment,
or letter or credit because none of this evidence could have been
obtained from a bank within the 14 days allotted for its production.
The letter, which Mr. Simon prepared for American on behalf of
Rochelle, stated, "I would not expect having difficulty making
acquisition and development loans [to Rochelle] in the future, barring
something unforeseen in the economy.
(R. 235.)
The Court described this clause, in the context of "shared . . . experience and
sophistication" of the parties, as referencing "credit lines held by Liberty and Rochelle and,
while making allowance for predictable guarded banker rhetoric, painted a positive picture
of Rochelle's financial strength." The Court also stated:
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The extrinsic evidence relating to the Financial Capability clause
yields the conclusion that Rochelle reasonably interpreted the clause in
a manner consistent with paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to the
extent that it required evidence that First Security Bank make a
commitment to loan Rochelle money "subject only to changes of
conditions in the Buyer's credit worthiness and to normal loan closing
procedures."
(R. 236.)
The Court further found that, not only did Alvarez not communicate to Jim Fairbourn
or to Rochelle any details of his expectation of the language's meaning, he had "ample
opportunity" to know how Rochelle interpreted it and could have remedied any
misapprehension. But "[h]e nevertheless declined to provide any meaningful clarification
of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle." (R. 235.) American Housing did not clarify
its demands, seek further verification from the bank, or otherwise attempt to close a deal with
Rochelle, which clearly had the ability to provide the full payment at closing. (R. 235.)
A second problem American Housing faces is its consistent urging that Alvarez did
in fact specify the nature of what "evidence" he wanted, including cash on hand, letter of
credit or firm bank commitment. In relying on Alvarez's testimony as to what the clause
meant, American Housing tacitly acknowledges that the "financial capability" clause is not
clear without explanation and does not otherwise support American Housing's interpretation
which Alvarez said was "crystal clear." (R. 406: Tr. 535.) American Housing attempts to
dodge the issue by urging that Fairboum Commercial has some affirmative obligation to
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make its own alternative interpretation of the clause. But the testimony at trial already
specified American Housing's own interpretation, which the other parties to the transaction
accepted, that the clause sought some evidence of Rochelle's ability to perform, (R. 233;
R. 409: Tr. 264, 289, 312, 402), and a letter from a bank showing a willingness to lend.
(R. 409: Tr. 270.)
Without evidence to support its position, American Housing, acknowledging that the
trial court rejected American Housing's contract interpretation, fearlessly plunges ahead by
urging that the so-called unambiguous phrase of "evidence of financial capability" should
naturally be interpreted as "cash, letter of credit, or firm commitment." (Appellant's Brief
at pp. 43-44). Appellant then further tries to demonstrate how crystal clear that language is
by spending over 30 pages in its Brief of Appellant wrestling to justify its "clear"
interpretation.
Any interpretation of this contract provision contrary to its express language depends
upon credibility of testimony of the parties attending the meetings, including non-parties to
this action. In making this determination, the trial court did not, and cannot be expected to,
suspend reality and to ignore common sense. In context of the undisputed testimony in this
case, the trial court found Alvarez's position as not being credible. Given the importance
Clark placed on getting these lots for Liberty Homes' Spring inventory, (R. 408: Tr. 261),
the trial court found it not credible to expect that Rochelle would have jeopardized the
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contract by ignoring what Alvarez alleged was, from the beginning, a clearly understood and
presented requirement of a letter of credit or other binding ability to close. Rochelle was
under a short time period for due diligence, was expending money for that purpose, and was
trying vigorously to comply with the contract obligations. The court found no credibility to
the assumption that Rochelle, under the 14-day time restraints, would take lightly such a
requirement allegedly so strongly emphasized by Alvarez. Further, the trial court found it
not credible that the Rochelle people, highly experienced in property development and bank
lending, would have accepted language requiring an impossible condition of letters of credit
or other "enforceable commitment," because the banking business is not done that way.
(R. 23 5.) Even Alvarez had no recollection that either he or American Housing had ever had
a bank make that type of commitment on a yet-unsubdivided property. (R. 408: Tr. 99.) It
is more credible that American Housing, aware of significantly greater profit opportunities,
sought a convenient way out.
The language in question, written by Alvarez, is not the product of an incapable or
incompetent draftsman. It is illustrative to compare the language and precision of the
"financial capability" clause with the language of American Housing's counteroffer, all
drafted by Alvarez at the same time. Scrutiny of the counteroffer, paragraph by paragraph,
shows Alvarez carefully and specifically crafted the language of each paragraph to avoid
ambiguity, including careful insertion of definitional terms. (R. 408: Tr. 67-73; Ex. No. 4.)
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Given the specificity of that language, and the evidence of Alvarez's clear drafting ability,
if Alvarez had intended to require a letter of credit, current cash on hand or a bank5 s binding
commitment, he not only could, but would, have said so.
The trial court found that "financial capability" clause ambiguous because it gives "no
guidance to either the quantity or quality of evidence" required. The trial court, in obvious
reference to Mr. Alvarez's drafting ability, pointed out that this clause lacked the precision
of "absolute assurance" language in paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract, for which
Alvarez insisted he was preparing a substitute. (R. 236.)
C.

AMERICAN HOUSING'S SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS COUNTER AMERICAN HOUSING'S
ASSERTED INTERPRETATION OF THE "FINANCIAL CAPABILITY CLAUSE"

Sufficient evidence was presented to the trial court as to why Alvarez would have no
interest in clarifying such interpretation to permit closing of the Rochelle Contract.
American Housing, prior to and during negotiation of the Rochelle Contract, had been faced
with both the City's rejection of the property zoning and the termination of the Coon Group
Contract. By the end of the 14-day period specified in the "financial capability" clause,
American Housing had brought under contract an additional five acre parcel which,
according to the "closed door" meeting with City council members, provided a comfort level
of City approval, which indeed was finalized the following January. (R. 408: Tr. 161-162.)
Moreover, the Coon Group Contract had been reinstated, with a closing date extended to
December 1st. (Ex. No. 31.) Finally, with the pressure lightened, opportunity existed for
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significantly greater profits if American Housing were now to develop and sell the lots.
(R. 409: Tr. 219-222.) While the trial court did not find evidence of a preconceived deal with
Leon Peterson before American Housing terminated the Rochelle Contract, Alvarez had
developed additional familiarity with Leon Peterson, his adjacent development and the
market generally. It was to American Housing's financial advantage to rid itself of the
Rochelle Contract and either to develop and sell the paper lots itself or to enter into a new
contract. Indeed, after all costs and fees, sale under the Peterson contract netted American
Housing $266,000 more than the Rochelle Contract would have. (R. 408: Tr. 153-154.)
American Housing's further actions support the trial court's decision. It helps to
examine Alvarez's own interpretation of the disputed language by seeing how he later
applied similar "financial capability" language in the Peterson Contract. As found by the
trial court, the Rochelle Contract contained no language granting American Housing the
unfettered right to determine what is satisfactory "evidence" of Rochelle's financial
capability. Shortly after the "termination" of the Rochelle Contract, American Housing
inserted a "financial capability" clause in the Peterson Contract similar to the Rochelle
Contract language but adding discretionary language as follows: "In the event Buyer is
unable to provide evidence acceptable to Seller in Seller's sole discretion, Seller shall at its
sole option cancel this Agreement." (Emphasis Supplied.) (Ex. No. 14.) Without American
Housing facing any threats or pressure from Rochelle or Fairbourn Commercial, and while
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this added language is not a model of specificity, this addition, drafted by Alvarez, tacitly
acknowledged the ambiguity in the Rochelle Contract and recognized that the Rochelle
Contract lacked even discretionary language to make American Housing the sole determiner
of the sufficiency of the financial evidence.
As further support for the trial court's ruling, showing the nature of American
Housing's intent as to evidence of a buyer's ability to perform, even after inserting
discretionary language in the Peterson Contract, it is significant that Alvarez did not even
bother to check Peterson's or KFP's credit. Instead, Alvarez was supposedly satisfied with
a conditional letter, not precipitated by Peterson or American Housing, being far weaker and
more conditional than the letters Rochelle had previously provided from First Security Bank.
(Ex. No. 17.)

Indeed, even with expressed discretion, Alvarez clearly intended and

interpreted the contract language not to require more—or as much—evidence as Rochelle
provided. American Housing's breach of the Rochelle Contract was not precipitated from
concerns about Rochelle' s financial ability but, rather, from an opportunity to net substantial
profits through the Rochelle Contract "termination."
D.

CONTRARY TO AMERICAN HOUSING'S ARGUMENT, FEW COURTS REQUIRE A
BUYER TO HAVE CASH ON HAND TO PROVE ITS ABILITY TO PURCHASE

American Housing next attempts to argue that Rochelle was not an "able" buyer.
Neither the Single Party Listing Agreement nor the Rochelle Contract reference a "ready,
willing and able" buyer. But that fails to deter American Housing from continuing to cling
4814-6554-3424 FA371 006
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to its attempt to force the transaction into a "ready, willing and able" context on the
assumption that this somehow will allow American Housing to avoid its judgment. But,
nevertheless, American Housing further argues that, regardless of the letters from First
Security Bank and the trial court's recognition of the commercial reasonableness of
Rochelle's interpretation of the transaction between "experienced developers" (R. 237),
Rochelle was not "able" to purchase in part because it did not show it had on hand the
amount of cash for the purchase price or its equivalent.
American Housing cites Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1974), and Shell
Oil Co. v. Kapler, 50 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1951), for the proposition that "the purchaser
cannot show ability by depending upon third persons in no way bound to furnish the funds."
However, Shell, cited with approval by Winkelman, states:
Rules for testing a purchaser's financial ability to buy are not to
be reduced to any unyielding formula, but must be flexible enough to
accomplish their purpose according to the particular facts of each case.
In ascertaining the rules reflected by an endless variety of cases, it is
particularly important to bear in mind that no decision is authoritative
beyond the scope of its controlling facts. Difficulty in both stating and
applying the rules stems principally from a failure to keep in mind that
their purpose—the protection of good-faith sellers as well as of bona
fide purchasers, brokers and other persons similarly situated—is to
establish a purchaser's financial ability to buy with reasonable
certainty. A purchaser may not have the necessary cash in hand, but
that alone, it is recognized, does not disqualify him if he is otherwise
so situated that he is reasonably able to command the requisite cash at
the required time. On the other hand, the seller is not required to part
with his property to a purchaser whose financial ability rests upon
nothing more than shoestring speculation or upon attractive
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probabilities which fall short of reasonable certainty. In short, the rules
are designed to protect the seller by binding him to a sale only where
there is a reasonable certainty of the purchaser's financial ability to pay
and, on the other hand, to protect the purchaser—and persons similarly
situated—from a technical, insubstantial, or sharp-dealing
disqualification.
50N.W.2dat712.
Shell clearly is not a sterling case for American Housing's reliance, not only because
of the above-quoted language, but because Shell involved a purchaser who had only $ 100 and
no other assets and clearly was not "ready" or "able" to purchase. Id. at 713.
Winkelman might give stronger support to American Housing's argument-if the Court
were looking only at the contract language and not at the other testimony and evidence which
the trial court accepted in interpreting the meaning of the "financial capability" language.
But, even at best, the court's position in Winkelman is clearly the minority position.
Only a few courts have taken the position that a purchaser of real
property is required to have the cash in hand to make the purchase in
order to be considered financially able. Most of the courts have taken
the contrary position, although several courts have recognized that
possession of funds sufficient for the purchase of the property
necessarily establishes financial ability to buy the property. In addition,
the courts espousing the latter view have found that financial ability is
indicated by possession of assets which will permit the purchase to take
place. However, one court has stated that such possession is
insufficient if a cash purchaser is required and the duration of time it
will take to convert the assets into cash is uncertain.
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Randy R. Koenderg, Annotation, What Constitutes Financial Ability to Perform Within Rule
Entitling Broker to Commission for Producing Ready, Willing, and Able Purchaser of Real
Property, 87 A.L.R. 4th 21 (1991) (citations omitted).
Generally, the courts, including Shell, relied on by American Housing, hold that
resolution of the meaning of the term "financial ability" in individual cases depends upon the
facts of those cases. In the context of a broker claiming a commission when a contract did
not close, the majority of courts have held that where the purchaser had the ability to obtain
a loan for the requisite amount, even though the loan was not obtained, the purchaser was
still able to complete the purchase and the broker was entitled to a commission. See, e.g.,
Sticht v. Shull, 543 So.2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Telander v. Posejpal,
418 N.E.2d 444 (111. App. Ct. 1981); Scott v. Cravaack, 372 N.E.2d 1375 (Ohio Ct. App.
1977); Record Realty, Inc. v. Hull, 552 P.2d 191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); Peter M. Chalik &
Assoc, v. Hermes, 201 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1972).
The trial court in this case resolved the factual issues through its examination of the
evidence and the determination of witness credibility. The simple conclusion is that the
Court determined that Rochelle complied with the Rochelle Contract, but American Housing
did not.
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E.

T H E TRIAL COURT, FINDING THAT THE "FINANCIAL CAPABILITY" CLAUSE WAS
AMBIGUOUS, CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE LANGUAGE M O S T STRONGLY
AGAINST AMERICAN HOUSING, THE DRAFTER OF THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISION

In the trial court proceeding, Alvarez argued that the Court should construe the clear
language of the "financial capability" clause he drafted to include arbitrary and discretionary
authority for American Housing to determine compliance with that section. The trial court
rejected the argument, determining that because the language was ambiguous, "the general
rule of contract interpretation [is] that ambiguous language is to be construed against the
drafter." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah
1996). The rule of construction should be applied where the contractual language is unclear
and susceptible to more than one interpretation.

Bryant v. Deseret News Pub. Co.,

233 P.2d 355, 356 (Utah 1951). The Court applied this rule of construction—that doubtful,
ambiguous contractual terms should be interpreted against the drafter—to determine the
parties' intent.
This Court has consistently held that ambiguities in contracts are construed against
the drafter where there is genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the language "upon which
reasonable minds may differ as to the meaning." Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Ass 'n,
589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979) (citing Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co.,
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958)). The Camp Court said:
That requirement is not satisfied because a party may get a different
meaning by placing a force or strained construction on it in accordance
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with his interest. The test to be applied is: would the meaning be plain
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the
matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural
meaning of the words, and in the light of existing circumstances,
including the purpose of the policy. If so, the special rule of
construction is obviously unnecessary.
Id.; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993).
The trial court, therefore, applied the applicable law by first finding that the contract
language was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one meaning and then, in the
interpretation, construing the language against the drafter.
F,

AMERICAN HOUSING CANNOT, ON APPEAL, FOR THE FIRST TIME RAISE THE
ARGUMENT THAT THE LISTING AGREEMENT WAS AMBIGUOUS

Further attempting to avoid the findings and judgment, American Housing now seeks
to throw in a new issue, i.e., that it is, says American Housing, the Single Party Listing
Agreement that really was ambiguous and should therefore be construed against Fairbourn
Commercial. This argument can readily be dispensed of:
1.

American Housing never raised this issue in either the trial court or Court of

Appeals. {See, i.e., American Housing's Trial Brief, attached as Exhibit "B".) Accordingly,
this may not now be raised by the first time. See State v. Smith, 866 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah
1993).
2.

Even if the Single Party Listing Agreement were ambiguous, that agreement

clearly provides that an earned commission was to be paid sometime, and certainly in no
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event after closing. So American Housing's argument is nonsensical because American
Housing made the issue moot by wrongfully preventing closing; and, as discussed thoroughly
in Section 1(A) above, American Housing cannot excuse and take advantage of its first
breach even by complaining of a subsequent breach-let alone by trying find ambiguity in an
agreement American Housing scorned.
G.

AMERICAN HOUSING BREACHED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING INHERENT IN THE BOTH THE ROCHELLE CONTRACT AND, THEREFORE,
IN THE LISTING AGREEMENT

The trial court in its findings recognized and resolved the reasonable expectations of
the parties under the Rochelle Contract and in the context of "shared experience and
sophistication in real estate development and financing." (R. at 235.) Inherent in the
Rochelle transaction, as well as the listing agreement, is the requirement that American
Housing deal fairly and in good faith. Inherent, also, in the trial court's ruling is that
American Housing, by not clarifying what it meant in the "financial capability" clause, even
after receiving the first bank letter, was not dealing in good faith (R. 237). Utah law
recognizes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. See
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55-56 (Utah 1991); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). "Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." St. Benedict's
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Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) (citing Bastian v. Cedar
Hills Inv. & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981)). To comply with the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, "a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." Id. at 200 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205 cmt. a (1981). To comply with the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, a party's actions "must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and
the justified expectations of the other party." Keith Jorgens en's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co.,
2001 Utah App 128, ^j 22, 26 P.3d 872 (citations omitted). In analyzing compliance, the
contract language and the course of dealings between the parties should be considered to
determine the parties' purpose, intentions, and expectations.

Rawson v. Conover,

2001 UT 24, If 44, 20 P.3d 876.
American Housing argues that its alleged discretion under the "financial capability"
clause trumps such considerations. But a party's possession of discretionary rights itself
creates an obligation and justifies scrutiny, under good faith and fair dealing principles, as
to the manner of the exercise of the discretion. In Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v.
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert denied,
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) the Utah Court of Appeals held that parties who retain express
power of discretion under a contract may exercise that power in such a way to breach the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Since parties cannot reduce every understanding to
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an express contractual term, the Court recognized that circumstances arise where one party
may exercise its contractual discretion in a way that denies the other party the reasonably
expected benefit of the bargain. Indeed a party to a contract may exercise a retained
contractual power in bad faith. Id. at 450, 451 (citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,1037 (Utah 1985)); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
horn, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
840 P.2d 130,138-39 (UtahCt. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992). Clearly,
even if the "financial capability" clause contained express discretion, as is American
Housing's position, American Housing cannot ignore the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing through its exercise of such discretion. American Housing breached the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing by canceling the Rochelle Contract without good cause and
selling the property to another party for considerably more profit and, in turn, attempting to
avoid the legitimate claims of Fairbourn Commercial.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals decision was correct in applying the Bushnell case. It is also
correct, and a legitimate alternative to affirmance, that this Court give deference to the trial
court's hearing of testimony, determining credibility of witnesses, and applying appropriate
legal and ethical considerations, and affirm that American Housing breached its agreements
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and should not be entitled to profit thereby. The Court of Appeals decision should be
affirmed.
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The trial court, therefore, applied the applicable law by first finding that the
contract language was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one meaning and then, in the
interpretation, construing the language against the drafter.
C.

WHEN BOTH PARTIES SIGNED THE ROCHELLE CONTRACT. FAIRBOURN HAD
SATISFIED THE CONDITIONS TO EARN ITS COMMISSION-

NO issue exists that upon the closing of the Rochelle Contract, which the Court found
American had wrongfully terminated, Fairbourn Commercial would have been entitled to
payment of its commission. (R. 408; Tr. 90.) Indeed, the Appellant acknowl edges that. The
Appellant, though, sets fonh the imaginative argument that, since the Listing Agreement
provides for payment of the commission at closing, American somehow defeated the
commission claim when it terminated the Rochelle Contract and prevented the closing
thereof.
Even if Rochelle had not complied with the provisions of the "financial capability-'
clause of the contract (which, of course, Rochelle complied with i. Fairbourn still would be
entitled to a commission from American. The general rule in Utah is that, without a contract
provision that conditions the right to a commission upon the buyer' s performance, an agent
earns a commission upon procuring a buyer who is willing and able, and accepted by the
seller. In Bushnell Real Estate v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983), the Court stated:
Absent a contractual provision, which conditions the right to a
commission on the performance of the buyer, the general rule accepted
in Utah is that a broker has earned his commission upon the procuring
25
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of a buyer who is ready, willing and able, and who is accepted by the
seller. The broker is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of
the contract and is not depnved of his right to a commission by the
failure or refusal of the buyer to perform. See e.g., F.M.A. Financial
Corp v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965). This is the
mle followed in a majority of jurisdictions. The defendants cite
Ellswonh Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson. 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967), as
authority for the proposition that notwithstanding the clarity of the
documents in imposing an unconditional liability for broker's fees there
should be an implied condition in the note setting up a waiver of fees
if the buyer defaults before completion of the transaction. This is a
minority rule contrary to the decision in F.M.A. Financial Corp. v.
Build Inc., and is factually distinguishable in that the Ellsworth Dobbs
decision involved inequality of bargaining power. In the instant case,
the parties dealt voluntarily and in a commercial setting. . . .
American claims that it does not owe Fairboum a commission because American did
not proceed to close on the purchase contract. However, the sole reason the closing did not
occur was because American's breach of both its Listing Agreement with Fairboum and its
Real Estate Purchase Contract with Rochelle. "[A] party who commits the first breach of
contract cannot maintain an action against the other for a subsequent failure to perform."
Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464,469 (1962). American cannot point to
the fact that closing did not occur in order to relieve itself of liability for failing to pay
Fairboum its entitled commission when the sole reason closing did not occur was because
of American's own breach of the Rochelle Agreement. But for Amencan's breach,
American would have sold the property to Rochelle.
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FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL, INC., a
Utah corporation,

:

Plaintiff,

TRIAL BRIEF

vs.

:

AMERICAN HOUSING PARTNERS,

:

INC., a Delaware corporation, and
ARMANDO J. ALVAREZ, an individual,
Defendants.

:

CIVIL NO. 000902534

:

JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING

RTS PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah

:

corporation,

:
Plaintiff,

:

vs.
:
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 000906546

:
:

Defendants American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American") and Armando J. Alvarez
("Mr. Alvarez") (together "Defendants"), by and through their attorney, respectfully submit
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this Trial Brief in support of their defenses against the claims of Plaintiff Fairboum
Commercial, Inc. ("Fairboum").
FACTS
1.

On September 9, 1998, American entered into a Real Estate Purchase

Agreement with the then owners (the "Owners") of the subject property which included
numerous contingencies regarding the closing of the purchasing including modification of
the zoning of the subject property for development (the "American Agreement").
2.

American negotiated extensions of the closing date on the American

Agreement numerous times with the Owners in order to allow American time to obtain
zoning and subdivision approval for the subject property.
3.

On July 27, 1999, the Owners notified American in writing of the termination

of the American Agreement due to American's failure to satisfy the contingencies.
4.

On July 31, 1999, the Owners demanded release of American's earnest

money deposit under the American Agreement because of American's failure to perform
under the American Agreement.
5.

On or about August 13,1999, Fairboum and American entered into a Single

Party Listing and Sale Agreement (the "Listing Agreement") whereby Fairboum was to
procure and present an offer from Rochelle Properties, LC ("Rochelle") to purchase the
subject property contingent, among other matters, upon obtaining final subdivision plat
approval.
6.

The Listing Agreement states that the Rochelle offer was to include the term

"Cash at Closing."
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7.

The Listing Agreementfurther states that American's payment of commission

to Fairbourn is conditioned on the offer of Rochelle being "at the price and upon the terms
and conditions set forth herein, or at any other price or upon any other terms or conditions
acceptable to" American due when the sale is "consummated".
8.

The Listing Agreement also states that in the case of Fairbourn's employment

of an attorney to enforce the terms of the Listing Agreement, American agrees "to pay a
reasonable attorneys's fee and all costs of collection."
9.

On or about August 13, 1999, Fairbourn presented an offer from Rochelle

Properties, L.C., to purchase the property within 60 days after subdivision approval and
contingent upon other considerations. Financing was not a contingency.
10.

American rejected the offer without counteroffer.

11.

On August 23, 1999, American negotiated a new extension of the American

Agreement with the Owners requiring that the sale close on or before December 1, 1999.
12.

On August 16, 1999, Fairbourn presented another offer by Rochelle to

purchase the property. On or about August 30,1999, American and Rochelle entered into
an enforceable sales contract for the subject property consisting of the form Real Estate
Purchase Contract and a Counteroffer/Addendum prepared by Armando Alvarez (together
the "Purchase Agreement").
13.

The Purchase Agreement was for a cash purchase of the subject property

and $2,272,000 payable "in cash at closing" and no contingency for Rochelle to obtain
acceptable financing.
14.

Paragraph 3 of the Addendum to the Purchase Agreement states:

Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties,
[Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of financial capability to
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close on the Property within the time frame referenced above [14 days from
final site plan approval]. In the event [Rocheile] is unable to provide said
evidence, [American] shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and
neither party shall have any further obligation to the other.
15.

American required a cash purchase of the subject property due to the rapidly

approaching closing deadline of the American Agreement.
16.

On or about September 10, 1999, Rocheile provided American with a letter

from First Security Bank which stated that First Security Bank "would not expect having
difficulty making acquisition and development loans in the future" to Rocheile but noting
that "[a]n acquisition and development loan would be subject to committee approval."
17\

When American indicated that the First Security Bank letter was not sufficient

evidence of financial capability of a cash closing, on or about September 17, 1999,
Rocheile provided American a second letter from First Security Bank which again stated
that such a loan to Rocheile "would be contingent upon the acquisition and development
loan receiving committee approval."
18.

Finding the second First Security Bank letter unacceptable as evidence of

financial capability of a cash closing due to the contingency of committee approval,
American canceled the Purchase Agreement with Rocheile by letter dated September 21,
1999.
19.

Rocheile requested and received a return of its earnest money on September

23,1999.
20.

On October 29, 1999, American entered into a Real Estate Purchase

Agreement with Leon Peterson ("Mr. Peterson") regarding the subject property (the
"Peterson Agreement"), based upon an offer first made on October 13, 1999.
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21.

American had no negotiations regarding the subject property with Mr.

Peterson prior to American's termination of the Purchase Agreement with Rochelle.
22.

Because American's negotiations with Mr. Peterson occurred after and

independently of its negotiations with Rochelle, the terms of the Peterson Agreement were
substantively different than the Purchase Agreement.
23.

On November 30, 1999, American negotiated another extension of the

closing date of the subject property with the Owners.
24.

Beginning January 10,2000, American commenced closing with the Owners

and finally closed on January 21, 2000.
25.

On March 28, 2000, Fairboum filed the Complaint against Defendants in this

action claiming breach of contract by Defendants and breach of broker standards(including
treble damages) and tortious interference with economic relations by Mr. Alvarez.
26.

Rochelle has brought no action against neither American nor Mr. Alvarez

seeking specific performance of the Purchase Agreement or any other remedy.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND RIGHTFULLY
TERMINATED BY AMERICAN.

The Purchase Agreement language is unambiguous and American rightfully
terminated the same. Fairbourn's argues that because the Purchase Agreement between
American and Rochelle contained the language that Rochelle was to provide "evidence of
financial capability to close" on the Property within fourteen days of the date of the
Purchase Agreement without precisely defining what would suffice as such evidence, that
such language is ambiguous and should be construed against American as drafter of the
Purchase Agreement.
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However, when Paragraph 3 of the Addendum is read in
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conjunction with the language of Paragraph 2 of the body of the Purchase Agreement,
which does not make the Purchase Agreement contingent upon Rochelle obtaining
financing, it is clearthat the a cash purchase is intended ratherthan a purchase contingent
upon approved financing. Furthermore, "a contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous
just because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does
[, t]o demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable."
R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1074 (Utah 1997) (citation
omitted).
Rochelle attempted to provide evidence of its financial capability to close on the
Property with two letters from First Security Bank that both stated that any purchase and
development loans to Rochelle were contingent upon "receiving committee approval" and
other considerations.

(Complaint fflf 21 and 22; Exhibits "D" and "E" of Complaint.)

American did not accept the letters as sufficient evidence of Rochelle's financial capability
to close on the Property because such representations were contingent upon factors
outside Rochelle's control (bank committee approval). Such a decision was consistent
with the plain language of the Purchase Agreement that was not contingent upon Rochelle
obtaining financing and Rochelle's failure to show its ability to close within fourteen days
of final site approval.
II.

AMERICAN TERMINATED THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT IN GOOD
FAITH.

American was well within its contractual rights to determine that the letters from First
Security Bank were not sufficient evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to close on the
purchase of the subject property. As indicated in the Listing Agreement with Fairbourn, the
contemplated purchase was to be paid in cash and the sale was subject to terms that met
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with American's approval. The Purchase Agreement was terminated pursuant to its terms,
the sale for which Fairbourn was to receive commission under the Listing Agreement was
not consummated, and Fairbourn does not have a basis for relief against American for
breach of the Listing Agreement.
The only act of bad faith of Defendants that Fairbourn claims in this action is that
American terminated the Purchase Agreement not because Rochelle failed to provide
evidence of financial ability of closing but because American had located a new buyer, Mr.
Peterson, that would pay more for the subject property. However, evidence at trial will
clearly show that American and Mr. Peterson did not commence negotiations until after
American had terminated the Purchase Agreement. Absent a buyer offering more money
for the subject property, the only incentive for American to terminate the Purchase
Agreement was that Rochelle failed to provide evidence that it could close a cash sale.
III.

IF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS, PAROL EVIDENCE
SHOWS THAT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS A CASH PURCHASE.

Should this Court rule that the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, then parol
evidence regarding the meaning of the subject language shows that American and
Rochelle intended to negotiate a Purchase Agreement which requires that the buyer have
the current ability to perform without a need for new financing. American was under
pressure from the Owners to satisfy the contingencies of the American Agreement and
close the sale of the subject property. When American entered into the Listing Agreement
with Fairbourn, the Listing Agreement expressly stated that the sale to Rochelle would be
paid "Cash at Closing." "Evidence of financial ability to close" was to be current evidence
of cash or ability to perform and not of a loan contingent on lender approval outside the
control of Rochelle.
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IV.

MR. ALVAREZ IS NOT LIABLE TO FAIRBOURN UNDER SECTION 61-217 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.

Mr. Alvarez is not liable to Fairboum under Section 61-2-17 of the Utah Code
Annotated as claimed by Fairbourn. Said section provides for recovery by aggrieved
persons of commission or profit obtained by licensed brokers or agents in in violation of
the Utah statute and rules regulating real estate brokers and agents. Though Mr. Alvarez
was a licensed broker, he was not acting as a broker regarding any of the contracts in this
matter and received no commissions. Fairbourn's claims are based on the false premise
that American and Mr. Alvarez are interchangeable parties and any benefit to American
should be deemed a benefit to Mr. Alvarez personally.

However, Mr. Alvarez is an

employee of American and was fulfilling his duties as such in the negotiation of the
Purchase Agreement and Listing Agreement. Plaintiffs witness acknowledges that Mr.
Alvarez was not acting as a broker in this transaction. Mr. Alvarez does own a minority
interest in American, but in light of the numerous properties owned and developed by
American, the claimed benefit to Mr. Alvarez by American entering into the Peterson
Agreement is nominal.
Furthermore, the only substantive rules or statutes that Fairbourn argues that Mr.
Alvarez violated are Rules 162-6.1.6 and 162-6.1.8 of the Utah Administrative Code. Rule
162-6.1.6 states:
In order to avoid subjecting the seller to paying double commissions,
licensees must not sell listed properties other than through the listing broker.
A licensee shall not subject a principal to paying a double commission
without the principal's informed consent.
This Rule specifies that it is for the protection of his principal, not a complaining
broker. As noted above, Mr. Alvarez was acting as an employee and not a broker in this
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matter. By definition the "principal," American, had informed consent from Mr. Alvarez in
terminating the Purchase Agreement and entering into the Peterson Agreement regarding
the subject property. Furthermore, the Listing Agreement with Fairbourn was limited to
Rochelle-no other purchaser of the subject property would entitle Fairbourn to
commission.
Rule 162-6.1.8 of the Utah Administrative Code states:
No licensee shall engage in any of the practices described in Section 61-2-2,
et seq., whether acting as agent or on his own account, in a manner which
fails to conform with accepted standards of the real estate sale, leasing or
management industries and which could jeopardize the public health, safety,
or welfare and includes the violation of any provision of Section 61-2-2, et
seq. or the rules of his chapter.
Fairbourn must show that in addition to a violation of the accepted standard of real
estate sales, Mr. Alvarez's conduct could have jeopardized the public health, safety, or
welfare. Fairbourn's claim that Mr. Alvarez's conduct rises to this level must fail given that
his greatest offense would be the misinterpretation of a contract provision, which Fairbourn
itself argues is ambiguous. Evidence at trial will show that Mr. Alvarez's actions in this
matter were in good faith and without the fraud, deceit, or public endangerment that would
allow Fairbourn recovery under

Section 61-2-17 of the Utah Code Annotated.

Furthermore, evidence at trial will show that Fairbourn's sole basis for its claim of bad faith,
that Defendants had found a higher offer to purchase the subject property, is baseless.
American did not commence negotiations with Mr. Peterson until after it had terminated the
Purchase Agreement.
V.

PLAINTIFFS CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE IS
WITHOUT MERIT
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Plaintiff claims that Armando Alvarez, as an individual, by canceling the contract
between American and Rochelle in his role as agent for American, intentionally interfered
with the contract between American and Rochelle. It is obvious that Mr. Alvarez neither
preformed any acts independent of American or that he acted with improper notice or by
improper means. Leigh Furniture v. isom. 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).
VI.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS ACTION

Though the Listing Agreement provides that only Fairbourn is entitled to attorney's
fees and costs in enforcing the Listing Agreement, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-27-56.5, a court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action when the provisions of the contract allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees. Defendants request that this Court award them their attorney's
fees and costs in defending against Fairbourn's claims in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Fairbourn has failed in the every theory to establish a
claim against Defendants. Both factually and as a matter of law, Defendants are entitled
to the judgment of this Court that American rightfully terminated the Purchase Agreement
and that Defendants be awarded their attorney's fees and costs in defending against
Fairbourn's claims in this matter.
DATED this _^_ day of August, 2001.

(

"N

f

DENNIS K. POOLE
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing TRIAL BRIEF in Civil
No. 000902534 PI was hand delivered in court on the A

day of August, 2001, to the

following:

Neil R. Sabin, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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